

Southwest Research Institute® Overview

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Presentation Outline

◆ Cybersecurity

- How prevalent
- How it is accomplished

◆ Connected Vehicle

- Where is it vulnerable
- How is it hacked
- What are the points of exposure in a deployment

◆ Next steps

- What should you be concerned about

Could hackers seize control of your car?

By **Barry Neid**, CNN
 updated 5:43 AM EST Fri March 2, 2012 | Filed under **Mobile**



(CNN) -- When car companies begin exhibiting at mobile shows, it's a sign that the "connected" vehicle has truly arrived, allowing us to take our digital lives with us as we hit the highway.

But while Ford's unveiling of its latest car at **Mobile World** -- a major cell phone industry event -- this week may have new automotive age, it also heightens fears that our technologically crammed cars could be hijacked by hackers.

Just like our PCs and smartphones, the computerized cars that have infiltrated almost every aspect of modern vehicle technology potentially be broken into, experts say. Only, with a car, the consequences have far more dangerous consequences.

Car-hacking: Remote access and other security issues

It's not time for full-on panic, but researchers have already applied brakes remotely, listened into conversations and more.

By **Linda Melone**
 August 6, 2012 07:00 AM ET 14 Comments

Computerworld - A disgruntled former employee of Texas A&M chose a creative way to [get back at the Austin-based dealer](#) by hacking into the company's computers and remotely activated the vehicle immobilization system, which triggered the horn and disabled the system in more than 100 of the vehicles. The dealership has a system in their cars as a way to deal with customers who file payments.

Police arrested the man and charged him with breach of computer security. His legal status was unclear as of our deadline for this story.

Out-of-control honking horns may be annoying, but other types of hacking, such as cutting the engine of unsuspecting drivers, could have deadly consequences. Although most experts agree there isn't an immediate risk, vehicle hacking is something that bears watching.

A [2011 report \(PDF\)](#) by researchers at the University of California, San Diego and others site numerous "attack vectors," including mechanics' tools, CD players, Bluetooth and cellular radio as among the potential problems in today's computerized cars.

SCI-TECH hi-tech Hackers steer a new route - to your car



AT&T Internet + Home Phone & Wireless or TV you won't believe all you'll get less than \$80 for 12 months

Exclusive: CEO says hackers tried to extort data, money

Karim Hijazi knew his nightmare was just beginning when he saw that a mysterious e-mail had arrived in his inbox at 3 a.m. on May 26 that included his e-mail password and the subject line "Let us talk."

That would mark the beginning of a weeklong saga of e-mail exchanges and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) discussions in which Hijazi says a group of hackers told him they wouldn't publicly divulge information they had gotten from snooping on his accounts if he revealed sensitive security information acquired by the botnet-tracking firm, **Unveillance**, that he launched last year. The hackers, who call themselves **LulzSec**, wanted to know the whereabouts of compromised computers on the Internet that when remotely controlled are used en masse to attack Web sites, he told CNET in an exclusive phone interview late last night.

When he refused, LulzSec went public with his data. Hijazi says, posting his personal contact information, e-mails, and chat logs for download online yesterday as part of a [campaign to embarrass](#) the FBI and its InfraGard partner. The group had hacked the Web site of InfraGard Atlanta and grabbed usernames and passwords for about 180 members, including Hijazi. Because Hijazi had used the same password on the InfraGard site that he used on his personal Gmail account and his corporate Google Apps account, the hackers were easily able to spy on his personal and business activities.

Hijazi contacted the FBI right after that first LulzSec e-mail and said he plans to prosecute if he can.

"They had me under the gun for a little over a week with threats and extortion," said Hijazi, chief executive of Unveillance. "The very nature of having to contend with someone who is holding something ransom is not pleasant."



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VULNERABILITIES / THREATS

8/13/2015
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The Summer Of Car Hacks Continues



Ericka Chickowski
News

New research shows how SMS messages manipulating vulns in insurance dongles can kill brakes on cars.

The summer of car hacks continues this week as another set of researchers demonstrated how it's possible to affect the control of a car's braking system without even engaging with any electronics embedded in the car itself.

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Big Data S

Cellular Security Topics in the News...



TECH | 9/03/2014 @ 3:00AM | 13,849 views

Rogue Cell Towers Could Be Intercepting Your Call



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Location: ACC-APG - Aberdeen Division A

Markets | Fri Jan 30, 2015 10:15am EST

BMW fixes security flaw in its in-car software

FRANKFURT

Army examines feasibility of integrating 4G LTE with tactical network

September 25, 2012

By Edric Thompson, RDECOM CERDEC Public Affairs


Stingray Tracking Devices: Who's Got Them?

Cybersecurity is not “one” Entry Point



Four Major Aspects of Cybersecurity


- ◆ How Can Someone Gain Unauthorized Access?
- ◆ What Could They do if They Gained Access?
- ◆ How Can We Detect Unauthorized Access?
- ◆ What Can be Done in Response to an Attack?



How Do Cyber Attacks Occur:

Penetration Testing

- ◆ **Assesses the susceptibility of a system to a security intrusion**
- ◆ **Methodical approach ensures that most frequent and most damaging attacks are mitigated**
- ◆ **Helps create and maintain a secure system at an acceptable level of risk**



How Do Cyber Attacks Occur:

Physical Attacks

- ◆ **Assesses what attacks may be performed with physical access to a system.**
- ◆ **Recovery of system secrets**
 - Cryptographic Keys
 - Passwords
- ◆ **Intercept communications**
 - Network and IP Traffic
 - Internal Signals
- ◆ **Modify and inject traffic**
 - Serial
 - Cellular
 - CAN



How Do Cyber Attacks Occur: Wireless Attacks

◆ Types



- Cellular
- CB Radio
- Mesh Network
- WiFi
- Bluetooth®

◆ Approaches

- Denial of service
- Device Spoofing
- Traffic Injection

◆ Tools

- Software Defined Radio
- Custom Hardware and Software



How Do Cyber Attacks Occur: Software Attacks

◆ Types

- IP / Network
- Embedded Firmware
- Business Applications
- Web Applications

◆ Approaches

- Reverse Engineering
- Fuzzing
- Configuration Analysis
- Design Review

◆ Tools

- Backtrack / Kali Linux
- Disassemblers / Debuggers
- Custom Scripts

OllyDbg - tnbtib.exe - [CPU - thread 000003F0, module tnbtib]

```
00402047 68 91554000 PUSH tmbt ib, 00405531
0040204C 68 02000000 PUSH 00000002
00402051 68 FE140000 CALL <JMP.&4D132_RegOpenKeyExA>
00402056 68 9A554000 PUSH tmbt ib, 00405500
0040205B FF85 98DFFF PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-268]
00402061 68 E2140000 CALL <JMP.&4D132_RegOpenValueA>
00402066 68 BF140000 CALL <JMP.&4D132_RegCloseKey>
00402071 68 57554000 PUSH tmbt ib, 00405557
00402076 68 FF75 24 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C]
00402079 68 450E0000 CALL tmbt ib, 00402F23
0040207E 33C4 08 ADD ESP, 8
00402081 68 9C990000 CALL tmbt ib, 00402A22
00402086 68 0A990000 JMP tmbt ib, 00402A11
0040208B 68 4F554000 PUSH tmbt ib, 0040554F
00402090 68 7F75 F8 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
00402093 68 7C150000 CALL <JMP.&CRTOLL_strong>
00402096 33C4 08 ADD ESP, 8
00402099 99C9 OR EAX, EAX
0040209D 68 75 6E JNZ SHORT tmbt ib, 00402100
0040209F 68 967B 1F MOVZQ EDI, BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+1F]
004020A4 68 990F PUSH EDI
004020A6 68 1C7 69010000 ADD EDI, 169
004020A9 68 57 PUSH EDI
004020AC 68 F1F FFFF CALL tmbt ib, 00401203
004020B0 68 13C4 08 ADD ESP, 8
004020B3 68 58 PUSH EAX
004020B6 68 7F75 FC PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
004020BB 68 56150000 CALL <JMP.&CRTOLL_strong>
004020C0 68 13C4 08 ADD ESP, 8
```

Registers (FPU)

EAX	00000000	ASCII "terminating."
ECX	004051C5	tmbt ib, 004051C5
EDX	FFFFFFFF	
EBX	0040505C	tmbt ib, 0040505C
ESP	0061F684	
EBP	0061F784	
ESI	00000018	
EDI	004051C5	tmbt ib, 004051C5
EIP	00402069	tmbt ib, 00402069
C 0	ES 0028	32bit 0FFFFFFFF
C 1	CS 001B	32bit 0FFFFFFFF
D 0	SS 0023	32bit 0FFFFFFFF
D 1	DS 0023	32bit 0FFFFFFFF
I 0	FS 0058	32bit 7FFD0000FFF
I 1	GS 0000	NULL
O 0	LastErr	ERROR_SUCCESS (00000000)
EFL	00000202	(NO, JS, NE, A, NS, PO, GE, I)
ST0	empty	-UNDEF E900 0012F6C 00000000
ST1	empty	-UNDEF F4FC 00000000 00140000
ST2	empty	3.2725161106811422910e-1952
ST3	empty	0.000000009914005440e-1932
ST4	empty	0.0
ST5	empty	-UNDEF 0235 00000000 00000000
ST6	empty	0.0000000000004775500e-1932
ST7	empty	-UNDEF F654 0012F64 00140000




Connected Vehicle (CV) Cybersecurity

- ◆ From a DOT / County perspective “connected vehicle” is a system of systems – its NOT just one connection
- ◆ Where is the responsibility for cybersecurity:
 - Standards
 - Network
 - Vehicle
 - Etc.
- ◆ CV is not just “DSRC”
- ◆ There are MANY entry points into a CV infrastructure

Cars are becoming complex...

(and Connected Vehicle is only part of it)



<http://www.informationisbeautiful.net>

◆ 1965:

- No computers
- No software

◆ 2015:

- Up to ~200 computers
 - Consider TPMS are 4 computers and wireless...
- >100 million lines of code
- LTE (or similar) enabled vehicles are becoming commonplace

Challenges with Connected Vehicles

◆ Recent attacks on Connected Vehicles:


- Jeep Cherokee: *“Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It”*
- GM OnStar: *“This Gadget Hacks GM Cars to Locate, Unlock, and Start Them”*
- Tesla Model S: *“Researchers Hacked a Model S, But Tesla’s Already Released a Patch”*



- Impact of these attacks:
 - Erodes public trust
 - Raises awareness – improves security practices
 - Not a setback for DSRC

The Auto World is Quickly Becoming Connected – by 2020...

Connectivity Market Update, Global, 2013 to 2020



Europe

North America


China

ROW

Source: Frost and Sullivan analysis


Security is a Balance...

- ◆ How much do you want to pay for security?
 - Usually not a lot until you are compromised ☺
- ◆ Like all technology solutions, a balance has to be reached based on funding, accessibility and reality
- ◆ Every organization has to decide the level of “acceptable risk”




Connected Vehicle Overview

- ◆ Cooperative system where vehicles communicate:
 - With each other (V2V)
 - With infrastructure (V2I)
 - With pedestrians, bicycles, etc... (V2X)
- ◆ Improves: Safety, Mobility, Environmental Impact
- ◆ Example Applications:
 - Emergency Electronic Brake Lights (V2V)
 - Overheight Vehicle Detection and Warning (V2I)
- ◆ Major question:
 - Who should you trust?



- A: Broadcasts hard-braking 'event' when decelerating over the defined threshold
- B: Vehicle potentially obstructing the view of Driver C and D
- C and D: Receives hard-braking event from A and displays a warning if the vehicle is in the forward path




Consider a CV Environment




- ◆ For Connected Vehicle to be successful it must be integrated into the transportation infrastructure

Consider a CV Environment: The Vehicle




- ◆ Vehicle may have several hundred computers
- ◆ Multiple networks
- ◆ Each an entry point into the “infrastructure”

Consider a CV Environment: Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)




- ◆ Vehicle can communicate to agency networks (e.g. DSRC)
- ◆ Data may pass both directions
- ◆ Vehicle may communicate to NON-agency networks also

Consider a CV Environment: Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V)



- ◆ Vehicles communicate directly with each other (trust issues)
- ◆ No public infrastructure required
- ◆ Focus of current NHTSA rulemaking

Consider a CV Environment: Vehicle to Pedestrian (V2P)





- ◆ Improving the safety of vulnerable road users
- ◆ Communications link may be DSRC, cellular, etc.
- ◆ Low latency and highly reliable data very important

Connected Vehicle Security

◆ **Connected Vehicles utilize a number of communication mechanisms and protocols:**


- Cellular
- Bluetooth
- Wi-Fi
- Dedicated Short Range Communications



- DSRC standards have security designed in:
 - IEEE 1609.2 standard
 - Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
 - Security Credential Management System


Connected Vehicle Privacy

- ◆ NHTSA mandate will require that vehicles publish a Basic Safety Message over DSRC at 10 times per second
- ◆ This will generate a lot of rich data!
- ◆ Standards are designed such that all identifiers “tumble” frequently to make it extremely difficult to track someone
- ◆ Information cannot be connected to a particular individual
- ◆ Policies will need to be in place to handle this type of data



Projected Growth/Interest in LTE

- ◆ Cyber Physical Systems & Internet of Things will drive future economy
 - Expected network revenue will exceed Cloud & Big Data
- ◆ LTE subscriptions will explode
 - 1 billion in 2016 (7 yrs after launch)





Fixed/Mobile Coverage (Convergence)

◆ Mobile Coverage (Wi-Fi vs Cellular)

- WiFi coverage is limited, but cellular coverage already spans much of the country and world

◆ Fixed/Mobile convergence

- Femtocells (10-20 m) extend cell coverage indoors and at edges of macrocell (esp. when spectrum is crowded (e.g. SxSW))
- Users benefit: better coverage, data, battery life, and lower fees
- Operators benefit: happy customers & more universal coverage



Wireless: What are the problems?


◆ Connected Car, Home, City

- Many mobile platforms / sensors will likely connect via cellular (LTE has broad coverage, moderate cost / power)

◆ However, problems should be expected

- 3G systems had numerous problems, including rogue femtocell attacks
- LTE security better, but control segment still unencrypted & many problems probably remain hidden
- Significant concern over a Man in the Middle attacks
 - Unknown vulnerabilities are always worse than what is known
- Hints of DoD “cyber needs” related to cellular


Rogue Base Station Attack Scenario



Rogue base stations could track users and intercept user data

How Hard is it to Hack a LTE Network?

◆ How real is the concept?



Cybersecurity “touch” Points:

Need to “worry” each of these...

- ◆ **Field network**
- ◆ **Bluetooth**
- ◆ **Wireless networks**
- ◆ **Wired networks**
- ◆ **Vehicles**
- ◆ **Any device that is connected to one of the above**

Summary

◆ Key takeaways:

- **Connected Vehicles are already here and the number of connected vehicles will increase in years to come**
- **DSRC will add another “attack surface” for vehicles and infrastructure**
- **Almost everything is “hackable” or “trackable”**
- **DSRC standards are designed to make it much more difficult to hack or track than other communication mechanisms in the CV environment**

◆ What can Florida do to prepare for DSRC deployment?

- **Extend security and data privacy systems, practices and policies to handle connected vehicle data and infrastructure**
- **Small pilot deployments to analyze security and privacy impacts – this can inform a larger deployment in the future**

Questions ?

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